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All in the Family: Interspousal and
Parental Wiretapping Under Title III of
the Omnibus Crime Act
INTRODUCTION
The interception and disclosure of wire communications is for-
bidden under Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe
Streets Act of 1968.1 With a few narrow exceptions expressly
provided for under Title 111,2 "any person" who intercepts by
wiretap the private telephone conversations of another is subject
to both criminal prosecution and civil suit.3 The statute's plain and
clear language encompasses all individuals who intercept the con-
versations of another through the use of electronic surveillance
devices. However, despite the inclusive and unambiguous language
of Title III, many courts have refused to apply the Act to wiretap-
ping between spouses or other family members. 4 The Second and
1 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-21 ( 1988).
2 One of the stated exceptions to the prohibition of wiretapping in Title III is the
"extension phone exception." Section 2510(5)(a) excludes from the definition of a wiretap-
ping device, "any telephone or telegraph instrument, equipment, or facility, or any com-
ponent thereof, (i) furnished... by a provider of wire or electronic communication services
in the ordinary course of its business and being used by the.., user in the ordinary course
of its business ... ." This exception allows a person to intercept conversations by simply
listening on an extension phone within the same household without being subject to liability
under Title III.
3 18 U.S.C. § 2511(1) (1988). Recently, the Sixth Circuit held in Fultz v. Gilliam,
942 F.2d 396, 400 n.4 (6th Cir. 1991), that a separate cause of action arose not only when
the conversations were intercepted, but also when they were used in court proceedings or
disclosed to someone who had not yet heard the tapes.
" See Anonymous v. Anonymous, 558 F.2d 677, 679 (2d Cir. 1977) (intrafamilial
wiretapping); Simpson v. Simpson, 490 F.2d 803, 808-09 (5th Cir.) (interspousal wiretap-
ping), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 897 (1974); Lizza v. Lizza, 631 F. Supp. 529 (E.D.N.Y. 1986)
(interspousal wiretapping). See also Newcomb v. Ingle, 944 F.2d 1534, 1536 (10th Cir. 1991)
(intrafamilial wiretapping), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 903 (1992).
The court in Newcomb perceived no distinction between the extension phone exception
to Title III contained in Section 2510(5)(a)(i) of the Act and interception by wiretap. The
court held that the interception of a minor child's phone conversations by a custodial parent
within the family home, whether by wiretap or extension phone, is permitted under Title
III because the extension phone exception evinces the intent of Congress to exclude all
domestic relations from Title III. However, the court asserted that interspousal wiretapping
is "still qualitatively different" from parent-child wiretapping. Id. at 1535. See also infra
note 80 and accompanying text.
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
Fifth Circuits have held that an interspousal exception is implicit
in the Act due primarily to both the extension phone exception
and the legislative history accompanying Title III. 5 More recently,
in a case of first impression in the federal courts of appeals, the
Tenth Circuit recognized a parental or intrafamilial exception to
the Act.6 The court held that the extension phone exception to
Article III clearly demonstrates the intent of Congress "to abjure
from deciding a very intimate question of familial relations, that
of the extent of privacy family members may expect within the
home vis-a-vis each other." '7
The courts have proffered numerous other justifications for
these domestic exceptions to Title III:8 first, Congress never in-
tended to extend Title III into the areas of marital and domestic
affairs;9 second, the Act's explicit extension phone exception indi-
cates the intent of Congress to exclude domestic affairs from the
Act;' 0 third, the wiretapping spouse could be subject to unduly
harsh criminal and civil sanctions;" and finally, the underlying
policy of both interspousal tort immunity 12 and parental tort
immunity 3 is to avoid conflicts between married persons and family
members, and these doctrines supersede the plain language of the
Act.
Notwithstanding this reasoning, the Fourth, Sixth and Eighth
Circuits, as well as numerous district courts that have addressed
the issue, have permitted the clear and manifest language of the
statute to prevail, denying the existence of implied exceptions with
the following logic: 14 first, the Act clearly applies to "any person,"
Anonymous v. Anonymous, 558 F.2d at 678-69; Simpson, 490 F.2d at 805-09. See
also supra note 2 and accompanying text (discussing extension phone exception); infra notes
42-47, 62-64 and accompanying text (discussing the legislative history of the Act); see
generally William J. Holt, Comment, Interspousal Electronic Surveillance Immunity, 7 U.
TOL. L. Rav. 185 (1975) (providing a comprehensive analysis of Title III's legislative history).
6 Newcomb, 944 F.2d at 1536.
7 Id. (quoting Simpson, 490 F.2d at 809).
1 See Sharon K. Smith, Note, Interspousal Wiretapping: Should State Law or Federal
Statute Govern?: Lizza v. Lizza, 10 HAMUNE L. REv. 255, 255 nn.2-11 (1987).
9 Simpson, 490 F.2d at 805.
10 Id. See also supra note 2 and accompanying text.
tt Simpson, 490 F.2d at 809.
Id. at 808 n.7.
" Robert A. Belzer, Comment, Child v. Parent: Erosion of the Immunity Rule, 19
HAsTINGs L.J. 201, 202 n.13 (1967).
14 See Fultz v. Gilliam, 942 F.2d 396 (6th Cir. 1991); Kempf v. Kempf, 868 F.2d 970
(8th Cir. 1989); Pritchard v. Pritchard, 732 F.2d 372 (4th Cir. 1984); United States v. Jones,
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defined as "any individual," with no exception being made for
spouses;' s second, Title III was enacted to combat the evils of
electronic surveillance, and is not concerned with marital con-
flicts;1 6 third, the state doctrines of interspousal immunity and
parental immunity, quickly becoming relics of times past in most
states, are not applicable in the presence of a federal statute;17 and
finally, a probe into the legislative history of the Act reveals a
congressional intent to reach all private electronic surveillance 8 and
an awareness that this prohibition would encompass domestic re-
lations cases. 9
Obviously, the circuits are mired in dispute over the legality of
interspousal wiretapping under Title III of the Omnibus Crime
Act. At the very least, this issue begs for the conclusiveness and
permanence that can be granted only by an edict from Congress
or the United States Supreme Court. Moreover, with the advent
of recent case law espousing an implied parental exception to Title
111,20 the issue of domestic wiretapping demands a decisive decree
now more than ever.
*At the outset, this Note analyzes the naked language of the
Act and its legislative purpose. 2' Next, domestic exception cases
are examined in light of the plain meaning and legislative history
of the Act.2 Finally, the cases holding that Title III encompasses
all unauthorized private electronic surveillance, including domestic
wiretapping, are scrutinized and eventually are shown to represent
the correct and logical application of the Act.23
542 F.2d 661 (6th Cir. 1976); Nations v. Nations, 670 F. Supp. 1432 (W.D. Ark. 1987);
Flynn v. Flynn, 560 F. Supp. 922 (N.D. Ohio 1983); Heyman v. Heyman, 548 F. Supp.
1041 (N.D. Il1. 1982); Kratz v. Kratz, 477 F. Supp. 463 (E.D. Pa. 1979).
1, Kempf, 868 F.2d at 972 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 2510(6) (1988)); see also 18 U.S.C.
§ 2511(1) (1988).
16 Kratz, 477 F. Supp. at 476.
11 See generally Holt, supra note 5, at 191-97 (discussing the waning validity of the
interspousal immunity doctrine); Belzer, supra note 13, at 206-20 (discussing the erosion of
the parental immunity doctrine).
"1 Jones, 542 F.2d at 668 n.11 (citing S. REP. No. 1097, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1968)
reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2112, 2113).
9 1d. at 668 n.12 (citing Hearings on Invasions of Privacy Before the Subcomm. on
Administrative Practice and Procedure of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 89th Cong.,
1st Sess. 18, 1009, 2261-62, 2365, 2411 (1965-66) [hereinafter Hearings]).
20 See supra notes 4-13 and accompanying text.
21 See infra notes 24-37 and accompanying text.
22 See infra notes 38-95 and accompanying text.
" See infra notes 96-120 and accompanying text.
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I. THE PLAIN LANGUAGE AND LEGISLATIVE PuRPosE oF TITLE III
Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act
of 1968 is commonly known as the Federal Wiretapping Act. The
primary goal of the Act is to "combat organized crime." 24 How-
ever, despite this fundamental design, Title III clearly addresses
the evils of private electronic surveillance. 25 The Senate Report
accompanying the Omnibus Crime Act lists the following as specific
aims of Title III: 1) to protect the private nature of oral and wire
communications, and 2) to characterize the situations in which the
interception of these communications would be authorized. 26 Thus,
Congress specifically stated its intent for Title III to combat the
invasion of individual privacy by private surveillance techniques,
while also providing law enforcement officials with the necessary
investigative tool of intercepting conversations in the course of
investigating and deterring crime.
The plain language of Title III prohibits the interception and
disclosure of wire communications by any person except as other-
wise exempted by the Act. 27 Further, the Act provides for criminal
penalties in the form of fines and/or imprisonment for not more
11 See S. Rm. No. 1097, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 70 (1968), reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N.
2112, 2157 [hereinafter SENATE REPORT]; see also Simpson v. Simpson, 490 F.2d 803, 806
(5th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 897 (1974).
11 See United States v. Giordano, 416 U.S. 505, 514 (1974). The Court stated the
objective of Title III as follows:
The purpose of the legislation, which was passed in 1968, was effectively to
prohibit, on the pain of criminal and civil penalties, all interceptions of oral
and wire communications, except those specifically provided for in the Act,
most notably those interceptions permitted to law enforcement officers when
authorized by court order in connection with the investigation of the serious
crimes listed in § 2516.
Id. (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
6 SENATE REPORT, supra note 24, at 2153.
18 U.S.C. § 2511 (1988) provides in relevant part:
Interception and disclosure of wire, oral, or electronic communications pro-
hibited
(1) Except as otherwise specifically provided in this chapter any person who
(a) intentionally intercepts ... any wire, oral, or electronic communi-
cation;
(b) intentionally uses ... any electronic, mechanical, or other device to
intercept any oral communication when
(i) such device is affixed to, or otherwise transmits a signal
through, a wire, cable, or other like connection used in wire
communication;
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than five years,2 and civil remedies in the form of "appropriate
relief." 29 Typically, when the bare language of a statute is as
unambiguous as that contained in Title III, and the plain terms
impart the clear intent of Congress to include all individuals unless
otherwise exempted, the language is controlling. 0 Nevertheless,
(c) intentionally discloses ... to any other person the contents of any
wire, oral, or electronic communication, knowing or having reason
to know that the information was obtained through the interception
of a wire, oral, or electronic communication in violation of this
subsection; or
(d) intentionally uses .. . the contents of any wire, oral, or electronic
communication in violation of this subsection;
shall be punished as provided in subsection (4) or shall be subject
to suit as provided in subsection (5).
"- See id. § 2511(4).
" 18 U.S.C. § 2520 (1988) authorizes the recovery of civil damages and provides, in
relevant part:
Recovery of civil damages authorized
(a) In General.
Except as provided in section 2511(2)(a)(ii), any person whose wire,
oral, or electronic communication is intercepted, disclosed, or inten-
tionally used in violation of this chapter may in a civil action recover
from the person or entity which engaged in that violation such relief
as may be appropriate.
(b) Relief.
In an action under this section, appropriate relief includes
(1) such preliminary and other equitable or declaratory relief as may be ap-
propriate;
(2) damages under subsection (c) and punitive damages in appropriate cases;
and
(3) a reasonable attorney's fee and other litigation costs reasonably incurred.
(c) Computation of Damages.
(2) In any other action under this section, the court may assess as damages
whichever is the greater of
(A) the sum of the actual damages suffered by the plaintiff and any
profits made by the violator as a result of the violation; or
(B) statutory damages of whichever is the greater of $100 a day for
each day of violation or $10,000.
" See United States v. Underhill, 813 F.2d 105, 111 (6th Cir. 1987); see also United
States v. Jones, 542 F.2d 661, 666 (6th Cir. 1976) (finding the language of Title III to be
"straightforward and comprehensive"); Patagonia Corp. v. Board of Governors of Fed.
Reserve Sys., 517 F.2d 803, 813 (9th Cir. 1975) (finding that the best evidence of legislative
intent is the statute itself); Kratz v. Kratz, 477 F. Supp. 463, 469 (E.D. Pa. 1979).
The Kratz court stated that legislative history is to be used with caution.
[The use of legislative history as an interpretive tool is a salutary one, for
legislative history is at best an imprecise barometer of congressional intent.
Hundreds of persons are involved in the writing and ultimate enactment of a
statute, and they may have many different opinions as to the meaning of the
statute they have created. A statute's legislative history will likely reflect the
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most courts that have confronted the issue of domestic wiretapping
have probed the legislative history of the Act. In deciphering this
legislative history, courts have reached different conclusions as to
the goals of Congress with respect to domestic relations under Title
IIV1
Title III was enacted in response to the deficiencies of the
Federal Communications Act of 1934,32 which did not effectively
safeguard individual privacy or promote law enforcement.33 As the
Senate Report 4 accompanying the Act stated:
The tremendous scientific and technological developments that
have taken place in the last century have made possible today the
widespread use and abuse of electronic surveillance techniques.
As a result of these developments, privacy of communication is
seriously jeopardized .... No longer is it possible, in short, for
each man to retreat into his home and be left alone. Every spoken
word [relative] to each man's personal, marital, religious, politi-
cal, or commercial concerns can be intercepted by an unseen
auditor and turned against the speaker to the auditor's advan-
tage. 35
Understandably, Congress was concerned about the prospect
of citizens invading each other's privacy through the use of elec-
tronic surveillance devices. 36 The courts are currently split on the
differences in motive and intent of its framers, and the statements made in
congressional hearings, debates and reports, by witnesses and legislators alike,
may be susceptible of varying interpretations.
Id. (footnote omitted).
3' Simpson v. Simpson, 490 F.2d 803 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 897 (1974),
and its progeny have interpreted the legislative history to imply an interspousal wiretapping
exception to Title III. See infra notes 38-64 and accompanying text. However, United States
v. Jones, 542 F.2d at 666, and its progeny have found in the identical legislative history a
congressional intent to include spouses under Title III. See infra notes 96-120 and accom-
panying text.
32 47 U.S.C. §§ 151-611 (1982 & Supp. V 1987).
" SENATE REnoRT, supra note 24, at 2153.
34 Id. at 2154.
3' Jones, 542 F.2d at 667 (quoting SENATE REPORT, supra note 24, at 2154).
16 See Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 475-76 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissent-
ing), overruled by Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
The evil incident to invasion of the privacy of the telephone is far greater
than that involved in tampering with the mails. Whenever a telephone line is
tapped, the privacy of the persons at both ends of the line is invaded and all
conversations between them upon any subject, and although proper, confiden-
tial and privileged, may be overheard. Moreover, the tapping of one man's
telephone line involves the tapping of the telephone of every other person
whom he may call or who may call him.
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question of whether this concern prompted Congress to include
interspousal wiretapping within the scope of the Act. Courts that
do not recognize the interspousal exception rely predominantly on
the Act's unambiguous language and its legislative history. Ironi-
cally, the courts that have recognized implied interspousal and
intrafamilial exceptions to the Act base their conclusions on the
legislative history as well.37
II. SMPsoN v. SMPsoN AND ITS PROGENY: IMPLIED EXCEPTIONS
TO TrILE III
A. The Interspousal Exception
1. Legislative History
In Simpson v. Simpson," the Fifth Circuit addressed a case of
first impression in the federal courts of appeals: whether a spouse
can sue another spouse, under the Federal Wiretapping Act. The
court, relying heavily on the legislative history of the Act,39 con-
cluded that Congress never intended to meddle in domestic rela-
tions.40 Thus, spouses living within the marital home must be
exempted from criminal prosecution or civil action under Title III.
In Simpson, a husband who questioned his wife's fidelity obtained
and attached a wiretapping device to the phone lines within his
home. The court admitted that the plain language of Title III
encompassed the husband's actions, but opined that Congress did
not intend the Act to extend into marital and domestic conflicts,
areas customarily regulated by the states. 4' Disturbed by the result
called for by the clear language of Title III, the court instead based
11 It is interesting to note that no courts adhering to this view recognize the interspousal
exception when third parties such as private detectives are involved. See United States v.
Rizzo, 583 F.2d 907 (7th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 908 (1979); White v. Weiss, 535
F.2d 1067 (8th Cir. 1976); United States v. Schrimsher, 493 F.2d 848, 850 (5th Cir. 1974)
(holding, only months after first recognizing a spousal exception in Simpson v. Simpson,
490 F.2d 803 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 897 (1974) (discussed infra notes 38-52 and
accompanying text), that a boyfriend/lover who had intercepted telephone calls was not a
part of the household, had no legal right to be on the premises and thus was not entitled
to assert the interspousal exception).
11 490 F.2d 803.
19 Id. at 807-08. See infra note 105 and accompanying text.
40 Simpson, 490 F.2d at 809.
4 Id. at 805.
1992-93]
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its conclusion almost entirely on an examination of the legislative
history of the Act. 42 In doing so, the court found no "positive
intent" on the part of Congress to extend the prohibition of private
electronic surveillance into the domestic arena.43
Simpson provides an excellent analysis of the legislative history
of the Act. The court considered the Senate Report that accom-
panied Title III, which states that "[t]o assure the privacy of oral
and wire communication, Title III prohibits all wiretapping and
electronic surveillance by persons other than duly autilorized law
enforcement officers." 44 The court noted that the report indicates
the wide berth given the Act, as evidenced by the following excerpt:
Virtually all concede that the use of wiretapping or electronic
surveillance techniques by private unauthorized hands has little
justification where communications are intercepted without the
consent of one of the participants .... All too often the invasion
of privacy itself will go unknown. Only by striking at all aspects
of the problem can privacy be adequately protected. The prohi-
bition, too, must be enforced with all appropriate sanctions....
The perpetrator must be denied the fruits of his unlawful actions
in civil and criminal proceedings. Each of these objectives is
sought by the proposed legislation. 41
Faced with this report, the court concluded that the focus of
the Act is crime control. Further, it concluded that the report
contained no clear indication of the intent of Congress to include
interspousal wiretapping under Title III.46 The court also researched
the lengthy legislative hearings on the subject, but again found no
adequate illustration of the intended breadth of Title III's prohi-
bition on wiretapping.47
Next, the court relied extensively on the presence of the exten-
sion phone exception contained in Section 2510 of the Act, 4s and
equated the exclusion of family telephone conversations intercepted
within the home with a congressional intent to exclude interspousal
and intrafamilial wiretapping as well.49 In fact, the court stated
41 Id. at 809.
41 Id. at 805.
'A Id. at 806 (quoting SENATE REPORT, supra note 24, at 2153) (emphasis added).
41 Id. at 806-07 n.9 (quoting SENATE REPORT, supra note 24, at 2156).
46 Id. at 807.
4 Id. at 807-09; see also Holt, supra note 5, at nn.67-68. The extensive hearings and
debate on Title III are cited in full.
- 18 U.S.C. § 2510(5)(a) (1988). See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
" Simpson, 490 F.2d at 809.
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that the exemption was "indicative of Congress's intention to
abjure from deciding a very intimate question of familial relations,
that of the extent of privacy family members may expect within
the home vis-a-vis each other."5 0 Finally, the court insisted that
such a criminal statute be strictly construed to shelter spouses who
violate the Act from the harsh criminal penalties of Title II151 This
combination of the Act's particularly stiff penalties and its incon-
clusive legislative history led the court to read an interspousal
exception into Title 111.52
The Second Circuit acknowledged an interspousal exception to
the Federal Wiretapping Act in Anonymous v. Anonymous. 53 A
wife and husband were separated and living in different homes.
The husband, who had custody of the couple's children, altered
his telephone answering machine to enable it to intercept conver-
sations between his wife and daughter.5 4 The court concluded that
the facts as alleged did not "rise to the level of criminal conduct"
required for a cause of action under Title III. 5
The court in Anonymous heavily relied on the Simpson court's
rationale that the extension phone exception to Title III disclosed
a congressional intent to refrain from wading into domestic rela-
tions.5 6 The court reasoned that if the husband's interception of
conversations between his wife and daughter had been through an
extension phone in his household, he would clearly not be subject
to suit under the Act. 57 Thus, by analogy, the court stated that
there was no distinction between overhearing phone calls on an
extension phone and intercepting them by way of a recording




52 Id. at 809-10.
" 558 F.2d 677 (2d Cir. 1977).
14 Id. at 677.
55 Id.
56 Id. at 679.
17 Id. at 678. See also supra note 2 and accompanying text. It should be noted that
the court also relied on one statement by Professor Herman Schwartz of the ACLU made
during the legislative hearings: "I take it nobody wants to to [sic] make it a crime for a
father to listen in on his teenage daughter or some such related problem." Hearings on the
Anti-Crime Program: Hearings Before Subcomm. No. 5 of the House Comm. on the
Judiciary, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 989 (1967).
" Anonymous, 558 F.2d at 679. In addition, it is worth noting that the extent to
which family members' privacy interests were threatened was equal regardless of which
method of interception was employed.
1992-93]
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The court held that the facts presented a "purely domestic
conflict," because the husband intercepted conversations between
family members only.5 9 The privacy rights of third parties were not
compromised. Thus, such intrafamilial strife was the proper prov-
ince of the state courts.60 However, the court did not rule out the
possibility that in a dissimilar fact situation, one in which the
privacy rights of third parties were violated in addition to the
family members' rights, the conduct could very well fall within the
bounds of Title 111.61
Consequently, both the Second and Fifth Circuits ignored the
plain and unambiguous language of Title III,62 and turned instead
to the legislative history of the Act and the extension phone excep-
tion to find an implied interspousal exception to Title III. Contrary
to fundamental rules of statutory construction, these courts pos-
tulated that since Congress did not explicitly include spouses within
an Act of such import, Congress resolved to exclude them.63 Fur-
ther, both courts deduced a congressional intent to exclude all
intrafamilial relations from Title III due to the analogy between
domestic wiretapping and the extension phone exception.6 4
2. The Interspousal Tort Immunity Doctrine
Although falling from favor in recent years, the interspousal
tort immunity principle has been tendered as support for an implied
interspousal exception to Title III by many courts,65 including the
Fifth Circuit in Simpson.6 6 This common law doctrine is grounded
on the notion that a husband and wife are one entity-the hus-
band. 67 Under this postulate, a woman has no existence without
her husband. The majority of jurisdictions still adhering to this
antiquated doctrine reason that it is impossible for one spouse to
sue the other because a man cannot sue himself.68 Although every




62 See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
63 See Anonymous, 558 F.2d at 679; Simpson, 490 F.2d at 805.
64 Anonymous, 558 F.2d at 679; Simpson, 490 F.2d at 809.
65 See Holt, supra note 5, at 191-97; Smith, supra note 8, at 268-69.
" 490 F.2d at 803 n.7.
6, Holt, supra note 5, at 191 n.32. For a catalog of the states still subscribing to the




Act, 69 which grants women legal identities, most of the states that
have traditionally adhered to the interspousal immunity concept
refuse to abrogate the doctrine . 0 Because the doctrine was fash-
ioned at common law, those courts have reasoned that the legis-
lature must unambiguously eradicate the doctrine by a legislative
enactment in order to supersede it.7' Finally, those courts have
held that judicial intervention into the institution of marriage would
threaten its very existence and would merely "take money from
one pocket and put it into the other."7 2
Most courts, even those sitting within jurisdictions that have
retained the interspousal tort immunity doctrine, have not applied
the doctrine when adjudicating alleged violations of Title III relat-
ing to domestic disputes. 7 This rejection of a doctrine once well
entrenched in the common law of every state is revealed by the
fact that only the Simpson court felt compelled to rely on the
principle. 74 Subsequent decisions that have recognized an inter-
spousal exception to the Act have refused to rely on the inter-
spousal tort immunity doctrine in doing so and have resisted the
doctrine's employment as a defense to Title III. 75
B. The Parental Exception
Recently, in Newcomb v. Ingle,76 the Tenth Circuit adjudicated
an issue of first impression in the federal courts of appeals: whether
Title III applied in a situation where a child sued his custodial
parent for the interception of his phone conversations by way of
a wiretap.77 All previous cases of such domestic nature had focused
on disputes between spouses. In Newcomb, however, a mother
intercepted conversations between her minor son and her ex-hus-
band by use of a wiretap on her own phone. During one such
Id. at 192 n.35.
70 Id. at 191-92.
1, Id. at 192 nn.37-40.
72 Id. at 195 & nn.46-47; Smith, supra note 8, at 268.
11 See United States v. Jones, 542 F.2d 661, 672 (6th Cir. 1976) (noting that in
criminal proceedings, husbands and wives have always been regarded as individuals); Flynn
v. Flynn, 560 F. Supp. 922, 924-25 (N.D. Ohio 1983) (stating that the "clear language" of
Title III allows for a suit based on interspousal wiretapping); Kratz v. Kratz, 477 F. Supp.
463, 475 (E.D. Pa. 1979) (stating that a Title III cause of action is mandated by federal
law and is superior to the state law doctrine).
74 Simpson v. Simpson, 490 F.2d 803, 806 n.7 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 897
(1974).
75 See cases cited supra note 4.
76 944 F.2d 1534 (10th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 903 (1992).
77 Id. at 1535. The minor had reached the age of majority by the time of the suit.
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conversation, the father of the minor child directed him to set fire
to his mother's home. The child's mother told a fire investigator
of the tapes' existence and eventually turned the tapes over to the
county attorney.78 The child brought suit under Title III against
his mother, the county attorney and others.79
The court recognized the controversy surrounding the inter-
spousal exception in other courts, but stated that the issue of
parental wiretapping is qualitatively different from interspousal
wiretapping.80 Nonetheless, the court followed the rationale of
Simpson8 and equated the interception of a child's phone conver-
sations by his parent with the extension phone exemption of Title
111.82 The parent could just as easily have intercepted the conver-
sations at issue by listening on an extension phone in the household,
an act for which she would not face liability under Title III.
One issue not raised in Newcomb, perhaps because the child-
plaintiff had attained majority before bringing suit against his
mother,83 is whether the common law doctrine of parental immu-
nity could render parental wiretapping exempt from Title III. If a
minor child chose to sue one or more of his parents under the Act,
presumably courts would be faced with the dilemma addressed in
Simpson: whether state law tort immunity doctrines are preempted
by Title I1.84
The only circuit to rule that the interspousal tort immunity
doctrine survives Title III has been the Fifth Circuit in Simpson.8s
The child-versus-parent scenario presents an even more fragile bal-
ance: a plaintiff who sues his or her spouse under the Act will in
all probability seek a divorce, thereby severing all ties with his or
her former mate. In contrast, a child and his or her parent will
almost always have a continuing bond with one another-nothing
analogous to a "divorce" is likely. Thus, although it is not clear
how the courts will rule on the parental immunity issue, it is clear
that interspousal wiretapping is indeed "qualitatively different"
from parent-child wiretapping.86
79 Id.
79 Id. Other allegations included violations of the plaintiff's rights under the First,
Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth amendments.
" Id. at 1535-36.
490 F.2d 803, 809 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 897 (1974).
Newcomb, 944 F.2d at 1536.
83 Id. at 1535.
Simpson, 490 F.2d at 806 n.7.
"Id.
Newcomb, 944 F.2d at 1535.
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Parental immunity is essentially an American rule that was
fashioned in the nineteenth century by a handful of courts." Be-
ginning with the landmark case of Hewellette v. George,88s a ma-
jority of jurisdictions adopted the rule that parents are not liable
for torts committed against their children.8 9 However, the under-
lying rationale of the rule is flawed, as children are not prohibited
from recovering from their parents in contract or property dis-
putes. 90 Notwithstanding this fact, most jurisdictions have retained
the rule, justifying it on the need to maintain the status of parental
authority and to further family harmony.91 Nevertheless, like in-
terspousal immunity, parental immunity has been severely eroded
over the years. 92 Several exceptions to the rule have been forged,
and many courts have simply abrogated the doctrine altogether. 93
In any event, the courts following the Jones rationale, which found
the interspousal tort immunity doctrine inapplicable, 94 could easily
discard the parental tort immunity doctrine on the same grounds.
But, as previously stated, these courts may adopt a different phi-
losophy when confronted with the child-versus-parent quandary.
Newcomb's recognition of a parental exception to Title III
marks the first court of appeals decision in more than a decade to
acknowledge an implied domestic exception to the Act. The con-
temporary trend among courts has been to interpret the unambig-
uous language of the statute, as well as its accompanying legislative
history, to include all persons, including spouses. However, these
courts have not yet faced the novel issue presented to the Tenth
Circuit in Newcomb-the policy of preventing suits between chil-
dren and their parents.
Presumably, the courts that have denied the existence of im-
plied exceptions to Title III would also refuse to recognize a
parental exception based on the plain language of the Act. How-
ever, while the legislative history evinces a congressional awareness
of interspousal wiretapping,95 it does not address parental wiretap-
" Belzer, supra note 13, at 201-02.
n 9 So. 885 (Miss. 1891).
19 Belzer, supra note 13, at 202.
10 Id. at 203.
91 Id. at 204.
12 Id. at 206-18. Several exceptions to the rule have been adopted, including the willful
or malicious tort exception and the emancipation exception. Id. at 206-09.
Id. at 221-22.
United States v. Jones, 542 F.2d 661, 672-73 (6th Cir. 1976).
See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
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ping. Notwithstanding this fact, the courts that have properly
denounced implied exceptions to Title III have based their decrees
essentially on the plain and clear language of the Act, not on its
legislative history. Even conceding the relevance of the legislative
history, Congress was primarily concerned with eliminating all
private electronic surveillance except for the stated exceptions,
thereby precluding the existence of either a parental or an inter-
spousal exception.
III. UNITED STATES V. JONES AND ITS PROGENY: No
INTERSPOUSAL EXCEPTION TO TITLE III
United States v. Jones" was the first court of appeals decision
to challenge the Simpson court's recognition of an implied inter-
spousal exception to the Federal Wiretapping Act. The court's
analysis of the issue was two-fold: 1) the clear and plain language
of the Act mandates that any person is subject to a Title III action
and no exception is recognized in the Act for spouses;9 and 2) the
legislative history of the Act evinces an intent to include spouses,
notwithstanding the contrary interpretation by the Simpson court.98
The court adhered to the rules of statutory construction in
finding that Congress would have explicitly provided for an inter-
spousal exception to the "blanket prohibition" of unauthorized
wiretaps in Title III if it had intended to create one.9 The court
also explored the legislative history of the Act in toto and con-
cluded that Congress was well aware of the fact that wiretaps are
frequently used to investigate domestic affairs.' °° In the Senate
Report that accompanied the Act,101 the court found an unequiv-
ocal congressional intent to create a flat ban on all unauthorized
electronic surveillance.10 2 Although the primary target of the Act
was organized crime, the court noted that the report clearly estab-
lishes that the purpose of Title III was to prohibit all unauthorized
electronic surveillance:
Title III has as its dual purpose (1) protecting the privacy of
wire and oral communications, and (2) delineating on a uniform
96 542 F.2d 661 (6th Cir. 1976).
17 Id. at 673.
" Id. at 666.
"Id. at 671.
100 Id.
101 Id. at 668-69 (citing SENATE REPORT, supra note 24, at 2113, 2153-54). See supra
notes 24-35, 39-43 and accompanying text.
102 Jones, 542 F.2d at 669.
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basis the circumstances and conditions under which the intercep-
tion of wire and oral communications may be authorized. To
assure the privacy of oral and wire communications, Title III
prohibits all wiretapping and electronic surveillance by persons
other than duly authorized law enforcement officers .... 103
The court also found a congressional awareness that Title III
prohibited private surveillance in the marital realm reflected in the
comments of the Act's Senate sponsors: "A broad prohibition is
imposed on private use of electronic surveillance, particularly in
domestic relations and industrial espionage situations."'i04
After delving into the lengthy legislative hearings on Title III,
the Jones court concluded that Congress intended to include spouses
within the purview of the Federal Wiretapping Act.105 The court
found further support for that interpretation in the fact that Sen-
ator Long, chairman of the Subcommittee on Administrative Prac-
tice and Procedure of the Senate Commission on the Judiciary,
and chief sponsor of the Act, identified three major areas in which
private electronic surveillance was widespread:
The three large areas of snooping in this field are (1) industrial,
(2) divorce cases, and (3) politics. So far, we have heard no real
justification for continuance of snooping in these three areas. If
any justification exists, we will probably hear about it in the next
few weeks .... 106
After carefully analyzing other pertinent excerpts from the legis-
lative hearings, the court found that Title III established an across-
the-board prohibition on private wiretapping, and that a para-
mount area of concern was electronic surveillance in marital rela-
tions.107 Thus, the court interpreted the legislative history to evince
a congressional intent to prohibit all private wiretapping with the
enactment of Title III. Of particular significance is the fact that
the Simpson court probed the identical legislative history, which
101 Id. at 668 (quoting SENATE REPORT, supra note 24, at 2153).
104 Id. at 669 (quoting SENATE REPORT, supra note 24, at 2274).
101 Id. Starting in 1965, Congress held numerous hearings on the problem of private
electronic surveillance. These hearings were the precursor to the Omnibus Crime Control
and Safe Streets Act of 1968. See Simpson v. Simpson, 490 F.2d 803, 807 n.10 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 419 U.S. 897 (1974), for a list of all pertinent hearings.
"' Jones, 542 F.2d at 668 n.12 (emphasis added) (quoting Hearings, supra note 19, at
2261). The subcommittee also heard testimony from two private investigators who stated
that electronic surveillance had become a common tool in domestic relations investigations.
Id.
107 Id. at 669 n.16. See also Holt, supra note 5, at 202-05.
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the court admitted unambiguously bans all private surveillance,
and then dismissed this clear legislative directive in order to fashion
a contrary holding. 18 The basis of the Simpson court's analysis is
inherently flawed. The question is not whether a congressional
intent can be found to include interspousal wiretapping, but whether
Congress intended to exclude such conduct from Title III.
While the Jones court refused to embrace the common law
interspousal tort immunity doctrine, it did not explicitly reject the
doctrine either. Instead, the court sidestepped the issue by correctly
declaring that spouses have always been viewed as separate indi-
viduals in the eyes of the criminal law, and thus there is no
interspousal immunity under the Act.'09
Although expressing no opinion as to the Simpson court's
holding that the extension phone exception is indistinguishable
from actual wiretapping inside the family home, the court voiced
doubt that the two methods were identical. 10 In reality, there are
palpable differences between an extension phone and a wiretap in
the interception of private conversations.1 " The extension phone
interception requires a live eavesdropper. Factors such as time,
hunger, sleep and carelessness restrict the effectiveness of human
interception. On the other hand, electronic surveillance demands
an insignificant amount of human intervention.'1 2 The sophistica-
tion and the low maintenance of the wiretap reduce detection and
provide continual interception of private conversations.13 Thus,
the extension phone is of limited use as an eavesdropping device
in comparison to an electronic surveillance device.
Most of the circuits that have recently addressed the dilemma
of interspousal wiretapping under Title III have followed the Jones
rationale. In Pritchard v. Pritchard,"14 the Fourth Circuit held that
an analysis of the legislative history of the Act was unnecessary
"[i]n light of the clarity and lack of ambiguity of the statutory
108 Jones, 542 F.2d at 667; Simpson, 490 F.2d at 806. Both courts quote the Senate
Report, which states: "No longer is it possible, in short, for each man to retreat into his
home and be left alone." SENATE RiEPORT, supra note 24, at 2154. In spite of this language,
the Simpson court concluded that there was no evidence in the legislative history of the Act
manifesting an intent to include interspousal wiretapping. Simpson, 490 F.2d at 805-06.
'9 Jones, 542 F.2d at 672. Jones involved a criminal prosecution under Title III. In
contrast, Simpson involved a civil action for damages under the Act.
11 Id. at 673 n.24.
M Holt, supra note 5, at 205-06.
112 Id.
11 Id.
14 732 F.2d 372 (4th Cir. 1984).
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language. ' "1 5 The court was presented with a factual setting similar
to that found in Simpson. A wife intercepted the telephone con-
versations of her husband by way of a wiretap in the family
home." 6 The court concurred with the Jones rationale that the
plain language of the statute, as well as the legislative history of
the Act, precluded the existence of an interspousal exception to
Title III: "We find that Title III prohibits all wiretapping activities
unless specifically excepted." 1 7
Likewise, the recent decision by the Eighth Circuit in Kempf
v. Kempf'18 sharply criticized the Simpson decision and relied in-
stead on the clear language of the Act that defines "any person"
as "any individual." 119 Additionally, the court weighed the legis-
lative history of the Act, finding that there was no indication that
Congress intended to create an interspousal exception to Title 111.120
The plain language of the Act clearly includes all persons, and
its legislative history manifests a congressional awareness of inter-
spousal wiretapping as well as the desire to prohibit all private
electronic surveillance. Whether Congress is aware of electronic
surveillance in the parental-child sphere is less clear. The legislative
history does not specifically address parental wiretapping, but does
manifest a congressional intent to prohibit private electronic sur-
veillance across the board. Absent a clear legislative pronouncement
to the contrary, the statutory language must prevail.
CONCLUSION
The circuits remain split on the issue of interspousal wiretap-
ping under the Federal Wiretapping Act, and neither Congress nor
the United States Supreme Court has clarified the issue.'2' This
ambivalence may be due primarily to the recent trend of interpret-
ing Title III as a comprehensive enactment to prohibit all electronic
surveillance. Both Congress and the Supreme Court may well con-
sider this all-inclusive application of Title III as the most appro-
priate implementation of the Act.
" Id. at 373 (citation omitted).
126 Id. at 372.
M7 Id. at 374.
'is 868 F.2d 970 (8th Cir. 1989).
"9 Id. at 972-73.
11Id. at 973. The court officially adopted the reasoning of Pritchard v. Pritchard,
732 F.2d 372 (4th Cir. 1984).
12 Congressional amendments to the original Act have been trivial in nature and have
not in any way addressed the issues of interspousal or parental wiretapping.
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However, the Tenth Circuit's ruling in Newcomb v. Ingle'2 has
again obscured the issue of implied domestic exceptions to Title
III. It is likely that the Simpson court and other courts subscribing
to its interpretation of the Act would recognize an implied parental
exception to Title III. Those courts could utilize the same approach
that led them to recognize an interspousal exception to the Act to
carve out a parental exception: if there is no evidence that Congress
intended to proscribe such wiretapping under the Act, it should be
exempted.
Presumably, courts following the Jones rationale as applied to
interspousal wiretapping would apply the same rules of statutory
construction in applying Title III to the parental wiretapping ques-
tion. The parental tort immunity rule would not apply for the same
reasons that the interspousal tort immunity doctrine was discarded:
the principles are out-of-date, and a valid federal statute is not
superseded by a state law postulate. However, the policies of family
harmony and parental authority that underlie the parental immu-
nity doctrine carry more weight than the interspousal immunity
policy of preserving marriages. Spouses involved as adversaries in
the civil or criminal arena will almost certainly seek divorce. On
the other hand, children generally do not "divorce" their parents.'2
Further, although the plain language of the statute obviously in-
cludes parents as well as spouses, the legislative history reveals a
congressional awareness of interspousal wiretapping, but not pa-
rental wiretapping. Thus, much of the' legislative history indicating
a congressional awareness of marital wiretapping would be of no
use to a court searching for an implied parental exception to Title
III. A court would have to rely solely on the legislative history
that evinces an intent to prohibit all electronic surveillance.
Nonetheless, the courts that follow the Jones line of reasoning
should not succumb to these substantial policy arguments in order
to maintain family harmony. Simpson and its offspring have been
rightfully castigated by subsequent courts for their disregard of the
plain language of Title III and their faulty interpretation of the
legislative history of the Act. The current trend has been to con-
form to fundamental rules of statutory construction in examining
violations of Title III. It is undisputed that the plain language of
-- 944 F.2d 1534 (10th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 903 (1992).
'2 But see Joseph R. Carried, 'Gregory K' A Termination of Parental Rights Case,
N.Y. L.J., Oct. 8, 1992, Outside Counsel section, at 1 (discussing recent Florida case in
which a 12-year-old boy successfully "divorced" his mother).
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the statute is all-encompassing, and although the legislative history
of the Act has been fiercely disputed, it proves that Congress was
well aware of the evils of electronic surveillance in the private
sphere.
Accordingly, the courts look to Congress to resolve the dispute
surrounding the issues of parental and interspousal immunity under
the Act. In the past, congressional inaction has forced courts to
look instead to laborious legislative hearings and debates for an-
swers. The recent recognition of a parental exception to Title III
has revived the controversy surrounding the interspousal wiretap-
ping issue, and now more than ever Congress must respond.
However, if a congressional response is not forthcoming, the
rationale of Jones must control. The plain and clear language of
the Act unambiguously provides that "any person" is within the
reach of Title III. Barring any express exceptions granted by Con-
gress, the explicit language is dispositive of both interspousal and
parental wiretapping immunity under the Federal Wiretapping Act:
neither exists. Further, both the Senate Report that accompanied
the Act and other legislative history manifest a congressional intent
to prohibit all private electronic surveillance. This unequivocal
"blanket prohibition" of private wiretapping must be honored.
Jonathan D. Niemeyer
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